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Abstract—In order to protect user privacy on mobile devices, 
an event-driven implicit authentication scheme is  proposed  in 
this paper. Several methods of utilizing the scheme for 
recognizing legitimate user behavior are investigated. The 
investigated methods compute an aggregate score and a threshold 
in real-time to determine the trust level of the current user using 
real data derived from user interaction with the device. The 
proposed scheme is designed to: operate completely in the 
background, require minimal training period, enable high user 
recognition rate for implicit authentication, and prompt detection 
of abnormal activity that can be used to trigger explicitly 
authenticated access control. In this paper, we investigate 
threshold computation through standard deviation and EWMA 
(exponentially weighted moving average) based algorithms. The 
result of extensive experiments on user data collected over a 
period of several weeks from an Android phone indicates that  
our proposed approach is feasible and effective for lightweight 
real-time implicit authentication on mobile smartphones. 
Keywords—implicit authentication; mobile access control; 
behavior-based authentication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile devices have become indispensable to daily life, 
providing convenient access to online services many of which 
involve monetary transactions and storage or transfer of 
sensitive personal data. As a result, they are increasingly 
becoming attractive targets to various malicious threat actors 
that can compromise the security and privacy of data accessed 
from and/or stored on such devices. Since mobile devices are 
particularly vulnerable to loss or physical theft, it is important 
to have effective access control and strong protective 
measures that secure the devices at all times. Access control is 
usually enabled by authentication of the user (i.e. the system 
should verify that the user is legitimate). 
Traditionally, user authentication has been based on three 
categories: ‘what you know’, ‘what you have’ and ‘what you 
are’. Password based authentication is a simple  example 
based on ‘what you know’. It is renowned for its simplicity 
and ease of use. However, a recent survey [1] revealed that 
users choose convenience over password-based security. 
Preference over weak password and reuse of same password 
has become a common phenomenon and users prefer to keep 
themselves perpetually logged-in to sensitive online accounts 
and applications unless required by the application to log in 
every time, which makes user information vulnerable to   theft 
(despite the use of passwords). Authentication based on ‘what 
you have’, such as adding a smart card reader on the phone or 
OTP (one time password) tokens is highly inconvenient and 
easily lost. Authentication based on ‘what you are’ is 
summarized in [2] which includes biometric features such as 
face and iris, fingerprint, voice/speech. However, biometric- 
based authentication schemes are computationally expensive 
for memory and power constrained devices. 
Recently, implicit authentication has been investigated  as 
an alternative to the traditional authentication methods. For 
example, [3-6] proposed schemes based on user behavior 
patterns or context. Although the results are promising, 
maintaining a balance between accuracy, adaptiveness, and 
practical feasibility is still an unresolved challenge. Hence, in 
this paper we propose and investigate an event-driven scheme 
that incorporates user-behavior awareness through data from 
everyday interaction with the phone. In order to provide real- 
time, lightweight and transparent operation in practical real- 
life scenarios, we consider easily derived user behavior 
features for user profiling and employ aggregate scoring and 
threshold computation for the implicit authentication scheme. 
This can then be used to activate or trigger implicit 
authentication (e.g. password, pin, voice, etc.) when there is a 
deviation from the usual or routine user behavior. Compared  
to previous works, important contributions  in our  proposed 
and approach include: 
1) Transparent operation: No manual interaction or
feedback from the user is required.
2) Adaptivity: Designed to adapt to shifts in user
behavior, with the method employing EWMA-based
threshold computation requiring no training phase.
3) Event-driven: No requirement for  continuously
running background services unlike many existing
authentication schemes.
In the rest of the paper, Section II reviews related work in 
mobile user behavior-based authentication while Section III 
describes our proposed authentication scheme. Section IV 
presents the evaluation of the scheme using real captured data 
from an Android device. The paper is concluded in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK
Related work on protecting data on mobile devices based on 
behavior  or  context  can  be  found  in  the  current literature. 
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TABLE I. COMPARING DIFFERENT FEATURES OF OUR PROPOSED SCHEME WITH PREVIOUS WORK 
Adaptivity User Interaction Threshold On-device operation 
Proposed scheme  in this paper High None Dynamic Yes 
Implicit auth. [3] Low None Static Yes 
Progressive [4] Medium Yes Static No 
CASA [5] Medium Yes -- Yes 
Intuitive [6] High Yes Static Yes 
Data-driven [7] Medium None Static Yes 
For example, a scheme called progressive authentication is 
proposed in [4] which utilizes face, voice recognition  and 
other features to determine the level of confidence in a user’s 
authenticity. Based on that level, access to public, private or 
confidential content is granted. Gait recognition is utilized in 
[8] to detect whether the device is being used by the rightful 
owner or not. However, the accuracy of result can be affected 
by footwear, ground surface, carrying load and injuries which 
can alter a person’s usual walking style. [9] enhances 
password patterns robustness with an additional touch screen 
security layer which is called touch screen pattern. 
Authenticating mobile device users through keystroke analysis 
is investigated in [10,11]. In order to provide reliable scores, 
keystroke based authentication usually requires a rather long 
training phase. If the device uses a soft input method instead 
of hardware keyboard, it will further complicate the issue. 
A type of implicit authentication scheme is proposed in [3] 
which creates a learning and recognition pattern by collecting 
and analyzing the daily behavior (phone calls, SMS history, 
browser history, network information etc.) of the user. The 
implicit authentication scheme in [3] scores recent user 
behavior based on the probability density function  and 
requires a large set of user data as training dataset. In contrast, 
our proposed scheme employs a different approach that does 
not rely on a user data training set despite employing a set of 
similar features (utilized in a different way). Moreover, our 
scheme unlike [3], is inherently capable of adapting 
automatically to shifts in user behavior. 
Another behavior based authentication scheme is proposed 
in [7] which utilizes probability density function to model user 
behavior temporally and spatially. This scheme is capable of 
automatically switching from training to deployment  mode 
and determining a suitable detection threshold. It is also able 
to activate a retraining module in reaction to changes in user 
pattern. However, this scheme samples the sensor data 1440 
times a day for both temporal model and spatial model, which 
means it frequently requires GPS or mobile network location 
(if GPS is not available) functions which could quickly drain 
the phone battery. As users frequently disable these services, it 
may not be a very practical solution. 
A context-aware scalable authentication scheme is proposed 
in [5] which is designed to reduce active authentication on the 
mobile device with the inference of surrounding context. This 
scheme infers the legitimacy of the user by implementing a 
probabilistic framework for dynamically selecting an active 
authentication scheme that satisfies a specified security 
requirement given passive factors (location). 
Another context profiling framework is proposed in [6] 
which  utilizes  context  variables  like  GPS  readings,    WIFI 
access point and Bluetooth devices. This framework is able to 
estimate the familiarity and safety of a context based on the 
context variables and use it to dynamically configure security 
policies. This scheme also allows user to provide feedback to 
calibrate the perceived safety of context. 
In Table I, a comparison of our proposed scheme with 
previous ones is summarized. As shown in the table, with the 
exception of the ‘Progressive’ scheme, all others are operated 
on-device. Thus, potential privacy leakage is prevented. For 
user interaction, fewer interactions means more convenience 
for users. Non-interaction also implies transparency and 
removes the need for complex user configuration, which can 
also introduce errors to the proper functioning of the 
authentication process. 
As for threshold and adaptability, the authentication scheme 
proposed in this paper computes (decision) threshold(s) 
dynamically, unlike the other schemes. The ‘intuitive 
authentication scheme’ [6] uses a static threshold to determine 
the safety level, but it updates CoI (context of interest) with 
every new observation and uses WIFI access point and 
Bluetooth devices as context variables. Therefore these two 
authentication schemes are capable of effectively dealing with 
the change in user behavior patterns. Data-driven 
authentication [7] adopts a static threshold and conducts 
retraining process when the behavior drift has been detected, 
which means this authentication scheme could leave mobile 
devices unprotected during the retraining phase. Hence, data- 
driven authentication is deemed to be able to moderately deal 
with user behavior change. The ‘implicit authentication’ 
scheme in [3] builds a user model based on a training dataset 
and adopts a static threshold. A static threshold will limit its 
ability to detect drifts in user behavior patterns which could 
occur due to events like long distance travel or move to 
another city for example. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
The user authentication scheme proposed in this paper 
models the user profile through the data  collected  from the 
user behavior. A scoring algorithm is applied to compute the 
level of trust of the current user. A decision threshold is 
adaptively computed below which an explicit authentication 
process can be triggered or activated to provide access control. 
Our scheme is aimed at operation without dependence on a 
user training set as much as possible. Thus, EWMA-based 
decision threshold computation is adopted as this enables zero 
(EWMA_Direct) or minimal (EWMA_SD_Block) training 
phase. 
A. Feature-based user profile modelling 
The proposed approach utilizes features derived from events 
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depicting everyday user routines or patterns of behavior. It 
aims to use easily obtainable, readily available and commonly 
found data that can be extracted from most phones in order to 
construct a user’s profile from routine phone usage. Hence, we 
consider the following as sources of data for our implicit 
authentication scheme: 
where Fdecision denotes the algorithm used to compute  a 
suitable decision threshold. After the threshold is computed, 
the system is able to make the authentication decision based 
on the current aggregate score and current threshold at any 
given time t (assuming t is between eventi and eventi+1). 
1) Incoming/outgoing SMS
Decision  F
decision  ASi ,Thresholdi , t  (5) 
2) Incoming/outgoing phone call
3) Browser history
4) WIFI history
5) App usage patterns
6) Location
7) Accelerometer  measurements
The experiments presented in this paper are based on the 
first four as sources of data. We plan to extend the scheme to 
include data from 5), 6), and 7) as well as other sources in the 
future to further enrich the user profiling capability. 
The workflow of proposed authentication scheme is 
presented in Fig. 1. Every time a feature-related event  occurs, 
where Fdecision denotes the approach which the system employed 
to determine whether the user passes the authentication or not. 
B. Scoring Algorithm 
A user profile consists of a number of features which are 
employed to generate a final aggregate score. The algorithm 
developed to compute the score based on each feature is 
explained in the following. 
Incoming/Outgoing SMS: Each time an incoming/outgoing 
SMS event occurs, the system records the time and a 
representation of the phone number. Each incoming/outgoing 
phone number is assigned a priority value calculated from: 
the event is captured by the event monitoring module. After 
that, the scoring module computes a score for the associated 
Value  120  48 OT   t (6) 
feature (e.g. if there is an incoming/outgoing SMS, the score 
for the incoming/outgoing SMS is calculated), and then 
computes a new aggregate score. Then the threshold 
computation module computes the threshold from the score(s). 
The decision module compares the current aggregate score 
and threshold to determine whether the user should be 
authenticated or not. 
Fig. 1.   System Block Diagram 
The features used to model user profile can be represented 
as: 
where OT denotes the total number of times the event has 
occurred, and t is the time between the current computation 
and the last computation (in hours). With the above expression, 
a cache of the most relevant events is maintained, as any value 
less than zero is removed from the list. OT is initialized to zero 
for any number removed from the list. Additionally, the 
formula allows for numbers that have been inactive for more 
than a week to be removed from the cache. Each time a new 
incoming/outgoing SMS event occurs, the system checks if the 
following conditions have been met whilst calculating  the 
score Score(is/os): 
Condition1: The system searches if this number is in the top 
5 positions in the priority value list. 
Condition2: The system checks if this number appears in the 
user’s contact list. 
The score is defined as follows: 
Features :  f1 , f2 , f3 ,..., fn  (1) 
Scoreis / os    Scorecondition (7) 
The functions to compute the score for each feature are 
represented as: 
Incoming/Outgoing  call:  The  score  is  computed  in   the 
same way as incoming/outgoing SMS except that it also 
checks the duration of the phone call. A long duration call is 
an   indication   of   normal   usage   and   this   is   taken   into 
Functions :  S1 , S2 , S3 ,..., Sn  (2) consideration in the score computation. 
Thus, the aggregate score AS computed by this model can 
be represented as: 
Browser history: The system extracts the browser history 
and records the domain name of each visited URL. Similarly 
to the SMS and call features, a priority list is maintained based 
AS   i 1 Si  fi  (3) on the calculation (for each URL): 
Since the scheme is event driven, an aggregate score is 
calculated  with  each  occurrence  of  a  feature-related event. 
Value  72  8 OT   t (8) 
Hence, an aggregate score stream (AS1, …, ASk) is obtained 
which is then utilized to compute the threshold. Thus: 
Threshold1,...,Thresholdk   Fthreshold  AS1, AS2,..., ASk  (4)
where OT represents the total number of times the URL is 
visited and t (hours) is the interval between the last visit and 
the current visit. A cache of the most relevant URLs is 
maintained by removing negative values from the list, and OT 
for  the  removed  URL  is  reset  to  zero.  Note  that   browser 
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history  is   extracted   periodically  (in  this study,   every  20 Damping  Factor:  A damping factor  is introduced  in   the 
minutes) as there’s no event notification that can be used in computation   of   the   score   for   each   feature   in   order to 
the system to easily detect browsing activity. Thus, it    checks compensate   for  long  periods of   inactivity   and   allow for 
how many domains have been visited in previous 20 minutes. 
The score for browser history is computed by checking how 
many newly visited domains are in the top 6 positions in the 
gradual decrease in the score. The damping factor µ is used in 
the computation of the score for each feature as follows: 
priority value list. The score is defined as follow: Score  Score    t (12) 
Score
browser  
  Scoredomain (9) where µ can be adjusted to meet the requirement of different situations. 
WIFI history: The system records the service set identifier 
(SSID) of the connected access point and the duration of each 
connection.  A priority value  list is also computed similar    to 
C. Computing the decision threshold 
After  computing  an  aggregate  score  from  the individual 
the previous features: feature’s  scores,  a  decision  threshold  is  determined  below 
Value  100  18 OT   t (10) 
which the system infers abnormal behavior and above which a 
routine  user behavior  is assumed.  An inference of  abnormal 
behavior  is  then  the  trigger  for  activating  extra  layer(s) of 
where   OT   denotes   the   total   number   of   times   the user 
connected to a specific access point and t (hour) denotes the 
interval between the last connection time and the current time. 
Connections that are less than two minutes are not included in 
the computation in order to avoid employing automatic   short 
authentication (e.g. explicit authentication.). 
In our scheme, we propose the use of an adaptive threshold 
in order to track and respond to shifts in routine user behavior. 
Additionally, it is preferred to minimize the training 
requirements for the model. Hence, we develop and    evaluate 
connections to access points on the move.      Each time a new 
WIFI connection is established, the system determines the 
score for WIFI history by checking whether it is within the top 
5 from the priority value list and then computes the score as 
follows: 
three threshold computation techniques: SD_Block, 
EWMA_Direct and EWMA_SD_Block. These are also 
compared to a static threshold based scheme that incorporates 
a training phase. The investigated decision threshold 
computation techniques are described as follows: 
Score
ap   
  Scorecondition (11) 
Fig. 2.   Examples of different threshold techniques 
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 AS 

1) Static threshold computation
In static threshold, when the training phase is finished,    the 
new threshold adaptively as outlined in EWMA_Direct. 
Threshold   mean (standard_deviation) 
system calculates mean value  and standard deviation   (of the 1 (15) 
aggregate  scores)  in  order  to  compute  the  threshold which 
remains unchanged throughout the monitoring phase. Static 
threshold is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a) alongside aggregate scores 
computed from real data collected between February and April 
2015 from a test user: 
Threshold   mean (standard_deviation) (13) 
2) Dynamic threshold computation
The dynamic threshold computation techniques are based  
on  standard  deviation  and  EWMA  (exponentially weighted 
Thresholdt    ASBAt1 1 Thresholdt1,   t  > 1
Here, ASBA stands for Aggregate Score Block Average. 
Instead of using single total score value as input to ASBA, the 
system uses the average of the current block (block size b can 
be adjusted in the implementation) as input to ASBA. The new 
computed threshold is used as decision threshold for the next 
block. For example, assuming initial AS (aggregate score) 
index of current block is k, block size is set by b. The value of 
ASBA is expressed as follow: 
moving average). EWMA is chosen for its potential to enable 
training free decision support. ASBA 
i  k  b 
i  k i 
b 
(16) 
a) SD_Block
This threshold computation technique is based on the 
standard deviation. The system divides the aggregate score 
stream into multiple equal-length blocks (block1, …,blockn) of 
length L. The first block is used for training and the computed 
threshold is used within the second block. This pattern is 
repeated continuously (i.e. previous block provides training 
scores for computing threshold for current block as illustrated 
in Fig. 2 (b), alongside aggregate scores computed from real 
data collected between February and April 2015 from a test 
user) . An additional (virtual) threshold is also depicted which 
is derived from incorporating error tolerance in the original 
threshold computation. The details are discussed in section III 
D. 
b) EWMA_Direct
EWMA method has been previously utilized by other 
scientific researches in a similar manner, such as admission 
control schemes [12] and buffer management [13, 14]. This 
method uses the weighted sum of previous thresholds and  the 
And the new computed threshold is used as detection 
threshold for next upcoming block from ASk+b+1 to ASk+2b+1. 
EWMA_SD_Block threshold computation is shown in Fig.   2 
(d) alongside aggregate scores computed from real data 
collected between February and April 2015 from a test user 
D. Error Tolerance 
An error tolerant design is incorporated to the decision 
threshold detection in order to allow for tuning to improve user 
recognition rates. This allows for a margin of error to be made 
in the decision while still being able to detect unusual behavior 
that would indicate adversarial use in a theft scenario. It 
considers a value V such that when the score is below the 
threshold but by less than V, a normal user behavior is  
inferred. Thus, term ‘virtual threshold’ is introduced into the 
system: 
Virtual_threshold   threshold  V 

AS  threshold ,                                       normal
current aggregate score output to compute the new threshold. 
Threshold1   AS1


Virtual_threshold    AS  threshold ,    normal 

 AS  Virtual_threshold ,               abnormal (17) 
Thresholdt      ASt 1   1  Thresholdt 1,  t  > 1
(14) V can be adjusted based on different user requirements. For 
example, if users want the system to be able to   accommodate 
Where AS is the aggregate score described in the    previous 
part, α is the weight which determines the importance of 
historical data in Thresholdt. The smaller α implies that the 
new threshold relies more on the previous thresholds and 
gradually draws close to the aggregate score. In the 
implementation, the α is set initially as 0.2 (as similarly 
applied in [6, 12]) since this is reasonable for the threshold 
adaptation speed in the system. In this method, the threshold is 
constantly changing whenever a feature-related event occurs, 
this can be clearly seen in the Fig. 2 (c). In addition, as shown 
in the figure, the proposed authentication scheme which uses 
EWMA_Direct threshold computation method needs no initial 
training period. 
c) EWMA_SD_Block
This method is a hybrid of the SD_Block and 
EWMA_Direct. Firstly, it uses a block of output aggregate 
score (block1 in SD_Block) as training dataset to compute the 
threshold1. Secondly, it employs EWMA method to compute a 
more false alarms, they can keep V at a high value. If this is 
not acceptable from a security point of view, they can keep V 
at a low value to accommodate more explicit authentication. 
The table below gives the user recognition rate  before  and 
after fault tolerance is implemented, the rest of parameters use 
configuration illustrated in Fig. 1. As it is shown in Table II, a 
dramatic increase of user recognition rate is observed after 
fault tolerance is deployed into the system, with 
EWMA_Direct increasing from 64.18% to 98.36% and 
EWMA_SD_Block increasing from 54.98% to 95.85%. 
TABLE II. USER RECOGNITION RATE BEFORE AND AFTER ERROR 
TOLERANCE IS DEPLOYED 

SD_Block EWMA_Direct EWMA_SD_Block 
Error Tolerance 
(on V = 10) 
98.28% 98.36% 95.85% 
Error Tolerance 
(off  V = 0 ) 
81.12% 64.18% 54.98% 
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Fig. 3.   The impact of error tolerance value on user recognition rate 
IV. EVALUATION
This section presents the impact different parameters have 
on the user recognition rate and presents the performance of 
the proposed scheme in adversary test scenarios (i.e. simulated 
device theft). An Android application is developed to extract 
the data based on the features described previously. In order to 
make the evaluation easier, the scheme and threshold 
computation techniques are implemented using Python scripts 
to emulate the logic of the authentication scheme. 
A. User recognition rate 
Fig. 3 to 5 depict the results of the experiments undertaken 
to evaluate the accuracy of the developed authentication 
scheme. Data is obtained from a Samsung Galaxy A5 device 
with Android version 4.4.4. The developed application 
requires a minimal Android SDK version of 8. 
Fig. 3 shows an ascending user recognition rate for 
SD_Block, EWMA_Direct and EWMA_SD_Block threshold 
computation methods when the error tolerance value is 
gradually increased. As mentioned earlier, a higher error 
tolerance value indicates that the authentication scheme can 
reduce false alarm rate. 
Fig.  4  depicts  how  training  length  can  affect  the    user 
Fig. 4.  The impact of training length on user recognition rate 
EWMA_Direct threshold method does not require training 
phase (can be seen in Fig. 2(c)), which implies that it can be 
deployed to detect abnormal behavior shortly after it is 
installed on the users’ mobile devices. 
recognition rate in static threshold, SD_Block and 
EWMA_SD_Block. From Fig. 4(a), a high performance from 
static threshold is observed from training for 1 to 3 days, and 
then drops dramatically afterward. This is because the score at 
the beginning of training is relatively low compared with other 
periods (score for some features is 0 if the user has done 
nothing related to that feature). Fig. 4(a) also indicates that 
dynamic threshold performs much better than the static 
threshold. This is because user behavior is changing constantly 
and hence requires the threshold to react adaptively in the 
same way, which the dynamic threshold scheme is capable of. 
Fig. 4(b) is the magnification of Y axis between  SD_Block 
Fig. 5.   The impact of block size and α value on user recognition rate 
Fig. 5(a) illustrates that the major trend of user recognition 
rate roughly decreases with the increasing block size. This is 
due to the EWMA algorithm which gives the threshold more 
space to catch up with the change of the score when the block 
size is smaller. The result indicates that small-sized block can 
achieve a better performance in user recognition. 
Fig. 5(b) shows an ascending trend of user recognition rate 
with α value increasing. In EWMA, the coefficient  α 
represents the degree of weighting, a higher α discounts older 
observation (threshold) faster. Hence, high value of α  implies 
and EWMA_SD_Block in Fig. 3(a), it shows that the new threshold computation is based more upon the current 
EWMA_SD_Block performs much better than the  SD_Block. score instead of the previous threshold. In reality low α   value 
An interesting observation is that the training length barely has is  expected  so  that  the   new computed  threshold  changes 
impact on user recognition rate of EWMA_SD_Block    which 
fluctuates around 98% user recognition rate. 
steadily and gradually draws close to the current aggregate 
score. 
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Fig. 6.   Example of adversary case 1 and 2 
B. Adversary case study 
Two adversary cases were investigated to emulate device 
theft and the results are presented in Fig. 6. The attack starts at 
15:00:00 (the device is taken by the attacker). The 
performance are evaluated by observing two metrics: NOC 
(number of computations before the first detection as 
illegitimate  use)  and  elapsed  time  in  minutes  (before  first 
The impact different parameters have on NOC and elapsed 
time is also evaluated during the experiment. Due to space 
limit, the results shown in Fig. 7 to 9 are for only adversary 
case 1. 
Fig. 7.  The impact of training length on NOC and elapsed time 
detection). An  interesting  observation in  Fig.  7  is  that  NOC   and 
Case 1: The attacker takes the device and interacts with it 
continuously but not intensively. E.g. connecting to WIFI 
previously unknown to the device, browsing unfamiliar 
websites, calling/texting numbers unfamiliar to the device. 
Case 2: This case represents a more intensive and 
immediate interaction with the device after it is taken from the 
legitimate user. 
TABLE III PERFORMANCE IN ADVERSARY CASE 1 
NOC Elapsed time(minutes) 
Static threshold N/A N/A 
SD_Block 29 200 
EWMA_Direct 26 171 
EWMA_SD_Block 12 115 
TABLE IVI PERFORMANCE IN ADVERSARY CASE 2 
elapsed  time  of  EWMA_SD_Block  are  independent  of the 
training length. Considering also the result from Fig. 4, we can 
conclude that EWMA_SD_Block requires very minimal or no 
training as well. Meanwhile, considering the user recognition 
rate for SD_Block in Fig. 4(b), the optimal value of training 
length for SD_Block could be determined in our experiment, 
which is between 2 days and 6 days. 
NOC Elapsed time(minutes) 
Static threshold N/A N/A 
SD_Block 9 16 
EWMA_Direct 2 3 
EWMA_SD_Block 7 5 
Table  III  and  IV  indicate  that  case   2 detects  the  non- 
Fig. 8.   The impact of error tolerance value on NOC and elapsed time 
legitimate use much faster than case 1. This is because the 
proposed authentication scheme is event driven and case 2 has 
more intensive activities on the device. Table III and IV also 
shows that static threshold is unable to detect the illegitimate 
use and EWMA-based threshold method performs better  than 
Fig. 8 illustrates the change of NOC and elapsed time under 
different error tolerance values. Considering the results from 
both Fig. 3 and 8, it can be concluded that the optimal value 
for error tolerance is between 8 and 10 for SD_Block, and 
between 6 and 8 for EWMA_Direct, and between 6 and 10 for 
SD_Block. EWMA_Direct shows a 
performance  than  EWMA_SD_Block   in 
relatively better 
adversary  case  2 
EWMA_SD_Block. Fig. 9 indicates that smaller value of 
block size can improve the performance of EWMA_SD_Block 
while the latter performs better in case 1. based  authentication  scheme on  illegitimate  use  detection. 
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Combining with results obtained from Fig. 5(a), it can be 
concluded that the optimal value for block size b is between 6 
and 10. These optimal values are the best operating points for 
the scheme that can simultaneously enable the highest user 
recognition rates and quickest adversary scenario detection (i.e. 
prototype of the authentication system will be implemented 
and evaluated on Android. 
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